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The recession and banking crisis of the 1990s have triggered a complete reorientation in 
corporate strategy by large Japanese firms, away from the previous goal of diversification 
financed by bank loans, and towards market-financed concentration on select core 
businesses. The transition has necessitated corporate reorganization by almost all large 
firms, causing a wave of spin-off, mergers, and acquisitions. Extensive legal reforms have 
enabled this reorganization and introduced more stringent rules on accounting and 
disclosure. The confluence of these two events – access and transparency – has paved the 
way for a market for corporate control, fueled by institutional investors and investment 
funds, including foreigners, as major players. While the M&A boom of the early 21st 
century may partially be attributable to a window of economic opportunity, the systemic 
changes in Japan’s financial markets are irreversible and therefore constitute a strategic 
inflection point. Contested corporate control has become an indelible part of Japanese 
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 Livedoor’s spectacular bid for a broadcasting station, possible jail time for Mr. 
Murakami for insider trading, Oji Paper’s failed hostile attack on its second largest 
competitor – even the most fleeting observer of Japanese business will have noticed a 
fresh type of news from Japan, revolving around activities by large investment funds, the 
emergence of activist investors, the increase in mergers and acquisitions, and hostile 
takeover battles, sometimes reminiscent of a good kabuki play. Seasoned analysts, too, are 
wondering what to make of these news: are they a harbinger of a rapidly developing 
market for corporate control in Japan, or just a short-term blip caused by the temporary 
confluence in the early 2000s of corporate restructuring that made underpriced objects 
available, and super-low interest rates that made them cheap? In other words, is the recent 
upswing in the market for corporate control just an entertaining but short-term spectacle, 
or does it constitute a true reorganization in Japanese finance and business processes? 
 One group of protagonists in this new play is investment funds. These pursue a 
variety of specializations, such as generic financial investing (hedge funds), buying up 
underperforming corporations (private equity funds), launching turnarounds for 
companies or spin-offs (buyout funds), staging shareholder initiatives and takeovers 
(activist funds), or buying the collateral underlying non-performing loans such as real 
estate (corporate reorganization funds). Because disclosure rules are limited, their assets 
under management, returns on investment, or even the total number of investment funds 
are difficult to gauge. Regardless of their success rate, however, in the early 2000s these 
funds brought a flurry of novel activity to Japan’s financial markets, changing the 
processes and competitive forces for corporate control. As main banks had declined in 
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relevance, and cross-shareholdings had been dissolved throughout the 1990s, Japanese 
companies had become more dependent on the financial markets for financing. This made 
more shares available for trade, and it also introduced new pressures to disclose reliable 
financial information in order to attract outside investors. The arrival of foreigners, 
institutional investors and investment funds has launched a virtuous cycle: attracted by the 
higher liquidity in Japanese financial markets they have invested more and demanded 
more disclosure of profitability measures, and the more these were provided, the more 
investors were attracted to Japan. 
 And yet, as of 2006 uncertainty remained whether this was merely a temporary 
shift. The doubtful predicted cross-shareholdings to reconfigure, restrictive anti-takeover 
defenses to reemerge, and old processes of keeping shareholders quiet to reappear with 
economic recovery. Investment funds would retreat once underpriced targets were no 
longer available and interest rates had been raised (e.g., Ekonomisuto 2006). Companies 
would return to postwar period management processes with an emphasis on long-term, 
repeated interactions with trading partners, and a very limited role for shareholders. 
 In contrast to this view, this paper shows that the transformation of Japan’s 
financial markets and business organization that began in the late 1990s is irreversible, 
and therefore constitute a strategic inflection point for Japanese business organization. So 
fundamental are the changes in laws, oversight, and corporate governance that a return to 
previous practices of informal, relation-based financial schemes is inconceivable. Society, 
too, has come to expect financial transactions to be governed by accountability and due 
process, as regulators are prosecuting violations much more rigorously than before. 
Japan’s financial system has graduated from postwar bureaucratic guidance and taken a 
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irrevocable turn towards market-based processes. 
 The emergence of institutional investors and investment funds in Japan is a prime 
indicator of how these changes are manifesting themselves, and why they are permanent. 
The paper begins in Section 2 with an expose of the main argument, describing the 
strategic inflection point of the turn of the century, which divides the “postwar period” up 
until the 1990s from “21st century” Japan. This strategic inflection has necessitated a 
reorientation of Japanese corporate strategy, away from the previous emphasis of pleasing 
banks as the largest lenders through aggressive diversification, towards a concern about 
anonymous institutional and foreign investors strictly interested in profitability. Section 3 
shows the growth and institutionalization of Japan’s markets for mergers and acquisitions, 
including hostile takeovers. Section 4 analyses how the resulting corporate reorganization 
has attracted these new institutional investors and their meteoric rise to the largest group 
of shareholders in Japan. Section 5 concludes on the implications for Japanese corporate 
management. 
 
2. Strategic Inflection: From Diversification to “Choose and Focus” 
 
 The severe recession of the 1990s culminated in a fundamental reorientation of 
Japan’s legal framework for business and finance, and with it the processes of regulation 
and oversight. This shift marked a strategic inflection point in Japanese business 
organization, in that the previous ways and processes of doing things were no longer a 
means to success; to compete, companies and banks had to completely reorient their 
business strategies (Burgelman/Grove 1996).  
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 During the postwar period (1950s-1990s), Japanese corporate strategies were 
geared towards growth through long-term relations. These were established through 
business groups (keiretsu), main banks and a dominance of bank loans in corporate 
finance, as well as long-term supplier and labor relations. Bank loans dominated corporate 
finance because interest rates were regulated at a low level, while restrictions on the bond 
and stock markets made bank loans cheaper and easier to attain. The high dependence on 
bank loans resulted in a very high debt-equity ratio, which reached an average of 600 for 
all large firms (with capital exceeding ¥1 billion) in the 1970s (see Figure 1). A company 
so highly dependent on outside funding will concentrate its corporate strategy on pleasing 
the main lenders, which were represented by the company’s main bank in a system of 
delegated monitoring (the main bank would take the lead in arranging not only loans, but 
monitoring the borrower and, if need be, step in to structure a solution to financial 
problems; Aoki et al. 1994; Hoshi/Kashyap 2001).  
  The banks’ dominant strategy was to furnish ever more loans, for under regulated 
interest rates (i.e., fixed margins) volume was the way to increase profits. Their main 
concern was corporate failure; profitability was of secondary interest. To be able to pay 
interest on the extensive and growing loans outstanding, companies needed to ensure 
growing revenues. This resulted in two dominant corporate strategies: (1) a focus on 
increasing sales, and (2) constant growth through diversification into new business 
segments. The first was ensured through membership in horizontal business groups with 
stable trade relations and cross-shareholdings. Companies also expended great effort to 
structure vertical distribution line-ups, to stake out a certain market share and tying 
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consumers into their product lineup.1  
 Under fast economic growth competitors were constantly investing at a rapid rate, 
forcing each company to invest aggressively to maintain its established market share 
(Abegglen 1985). This necessitated new bank loans and increased the pressure to maintain 
sales revenues. Where existing businesses were not enough, companies pursued growth 
by entering new business areas. As a result of this diversification strategy, so-called 
“general companies” emerged in most industries. For example, the ten largest electronics 
firms were all such “sōgō denki” companies, producing white and brown goods 
(household appliances and audio/TV) as well as parts (batteries, cords, light bulbs, LCDs, 
or semiconductors), while running their own distribution chains. The banks were 
supportive of this aggressive diversification, as it increased interest income and provided 
insurance against bankruptcy: should a company see one of its businesses suffer from a 
cyclical or structural slump, it would still survive by virtue of being represented in other 
business segments.2
 The bubble economy (1987-1991) added to this strategic diversification (which 
was also actively pursued in other countries at the time) a wave of exuberant 
diversification, such as through investments in hotel chains, baseball teams, or real estate 
not required for production purposes. When the bubble burst, the losses from this 
exuberant diversification grew enormously, while the stagnation of the 1990s undermined 
sales such that many companies were suddenly unable to pay interest on their 
mushrooming debt. This led to a corporate crisis that eventually triggered a banking crisis.  
                                                 
1 See Gerlach (1992) and Lincoln/Gerlach (2004) on business groups. In many products, the system was 
fortified through price agreements among competitors; see Schaede (2000). This interpretation of  postwar 
corporate strategy is developed in detail in Schaede (forthcoming), Chapter 2. 
2 Lifetime employment increased the tendency towards aggressive diversification, because it was difficult to 
close down a business unit but easy to create new ones.  
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 In the postwar period, banks addressed nonperforming loans by structuring 
informal turnarounds which left the loans on the banks’ books, covered annually by loss 
reserves taken from bank profits. The idea was to save the company by structuring a 
turnaround and recouping the debt in the long run. In the 1990s, informal debt refinancing 
put such tremendous stress on banks’ profits that it caused a banking crisis in 1998 in 
which Japan came perilously close to a financial meltdown.3 This necessitated a switch to 
direct bad-loan disposal methods, in which the bank suffers a one-time “extraordinary” 
loss by writing off the loan, and initiates bankruptcy procedures and “restructuring” 
(closing down or selling off the least profitable business units). One way for the banks to 
hold on to at least something of value in these write-offs was to structure debt-forgiveness 
in which bad loans were swapped into equity shares which might gain value with a 
successful turnaround. These shares were sold off, typically at only a few cents for each 
dollar of bad debt, to outside investors – in the late 1990s, mostly to U.S. investment 
funds.  
 The new strategy that emerged in the early 21st century for corporate 
reorganization was labeled “choose and focus” (sentaku to shūchū). Referring to 
corporate unbundling, this was a call for companies to identify their core businesses and 
concentrate all their resources (human, capital and managerial) on winning in these core 
                                                 
3 The bankruptcies of  a city bank and a leading investment bank in November 1997 revealed that most 
large banks were unable to reach the capital adequacy ratio of  8% required for banks operating 
internationally. Any large bank dropping below this ratio would most likely have triggered a bank run. The 
government injected a total of  ¥9.3 trillion (roughly $90 billion) into the countries’ leading banks. Fierce 
political debate translated into stringent rules for the recipient banks on how to improve their business, 
including an aggressive cleanup of  bad loans. A 1998 legal revision allowed holding companies and 
enabled the 13 leading banks to merge into four large financial groups (Mizuho, MUFG, Sumitomo-Mitsui, 
and Resona). Two long-term credit banks under government receivership were revived by two U.S. 
investment funds into Shinsei and Aozora. Smaller banks were in a similarly perilous situation, and their 
restructuring triggered the “credit crunch” of  the period 1998-2003, during which many small firms lost 
access to funding. All this exacerbated an already ongoing recession, increasing pressure on the 
government to execute legal reforms. Amyx (2004) analysis the political background to this crisis.. 
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businesses. This strategy involved shedding all non-core business units and downsizing 
through outsourcing processes and functions not directly contributive to core profits.4  
 Banks and corporations were suddenly in the business of active reorganization, 
pursuing direct loan disposal methods and a reorientation of corporate strategy. Both 
required a rewriting of Japanese rules and regulations pertaining to corporate 
reorganization and spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions, and bankruptcies. Understanding 
that the existing system stymied restructuring, the government had begun successive 
revisions of the Commercial Code in 1998. Changes were accelerated in 2002, which 
entered the books as the year of “saisei” (revitalization), a government moniker for an 
aggressive reform program including new rules of financial regulation and oversight, new 
transparency through stricter accounting and disclosure requirements, and new options for 
corporate reorganization.5  
 All this culminated in a new “Corporation Law”, effective May 2006, which 
replaced the Commercial Code as the main set of rules on corporate behavior. This law 
was based on nothing less than a complete reversal in regulatory philosophy, by shifting 
from the previous logic of “ex ante regulation” (i.e., everything that is not explicitly 
allowed is therefore prohibited) towards “post-remedy” rules (everything that is not 
specifically prohibited is therefore allowed, with courts ruling on problematic issues as 
they occur).6 Whereas in the postwar period, corporate management had limited flexibility 
                                                 
4 Until a 2002 Commercial Code revision, labor could veto transfer to a spun-off  business, to maintain 
employment at a large firm with higher wages. On the implications of  “choose and focus” on employment, 
see Schaede (forthcoming).  
5 Shifts in politics were critically important. See Pempel (1998) for a prescient analysis of  the precursors to 
this “regime shift”, and Vogel (2006) for the interplay of  government and business in this reform process.  
6 Fujita (2006) describes the shift as one from “preemptive rules, with informal bureaucratic discretion in 
ambiguous areas” to “freedom in principle, with ongoing formal oversight”. This shift had formed the 
basis of  Commercial Code revisions since 2000; see Ministry of  Justice, “Japanese Corporate Law: Drastic 
Changes in 2000-2001 and the Future”, www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/jcld-01.html. 
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but could not easily be held responsible as long as it operated within the law, in the 21st 
century, management is free to shed old businesses, purchase new businesses, and manage 
the company as it sees fit, but the law has greatly empowered the rights of shareholders, 
the need for disclosure, and the accountability of management for its actions. The 2006 




 Table 1 provides a timeline of the legal reforms between 1997 and 2006, which 
can be categorized into four groups. The first set of changes concerned regulation, 
transparency and oversight, which began with the “Big Bang” financial reforms of 1998. 
The Big Bang, importantly, also included the 1998 revision of the Foreign Exchange Law, 
which removed last vestiges of cross-border financial controls, thus greatly facilitating 
financial operations by foreigners in Japan. In terms of domestic markets, Big Bang 
reforms (and their subsequent continuations) covered almost all financial areas, and had 
in common a big push towards stricter disclosure, in particular, a shift to accounting at 
current market values as opposed to historical book values, as well as consolidated 
balance sheets. New transparency was paired with reforms in financial regulation, as the 
previous reliance on informal process regulation through administrative guidance and 
behind-closed-doors workouts was replaced with by-the-book inspections and meaningful 
sanctions of violators. In particular, with the establishment of the Financial Services 
                                                 
7 Liability by management has been limited, comparable to other countries. Some have interpreted the new 
limited liability as a sign of  continuing old practices. However, it seems not feasible to introduce 
market-based processes of  corporate governance without clear liability delineations. Thus, the new 
limitations do not contradict but rather prove the shift towards greater shareholder rights. 
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Agency in 1998, and the fast rise to true authority by that agency, even laggard banks had 
to face the reality of their non-performing loan quandary. Beginning with the first quarter 
of fiscal year 2003, the Tokyo Stock Exchange introduced a requirement of quarterly 
earning statements for all listed companies.8
 A second change came with new bankruptcy legislation. In the postwar period, 
failing firms had little choice but to follow an informal workout led by the main banks, 
because existing laws were too cumbersome for “Chapter 11” type reorganizations. The 
2000 “Civil Rehabilitation Law” facilitated such reorganization (including for 
individuals), and together with the 2003 revision of the “Corporate Reorganization Law” 
introduced new processes for efficiently structured turnarounds. The courts of Tokyo and 
Osaka established special divisions to handle such procedures efficiently. A further reform 
in this area was a 2001 guideline for “out-of-court workouts” that clarified the structure of 
bank-led turnarounds. Finally, the 2004 revision of the Liquidation Law established 
clear-cut rules for a shutdown of debtors and a fair distribution of assets. All this triggered 
a wave of shutdowns and reorganizations, and helped greatly in cleaning up 
non-performing loans. 
 The third area of reform pertained to corporate restructuring and reorganization. 
At the end of this process, Japanese companies now have a variety of options for 
reorganization through mergers and acquisitions and spin-offs. Stock market rules were 
reconfigured to allow for the exchange of ownership stakes, friendly or hostile; for 
example, in 1998 stock buybacks were allowed to enable companies to repurchase the 
equity overhang created during the bubble years. It became possible to swap stocks to 
                                                 
8 The Osaka Stock Exchange followed suit the next year. For the more recently established exchanges for 
startup companies, such as MOTHERS and Hercules, quarterly earnings reports were already required.  
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accomplish a merger, and by allowing a variety of different types of stock, companies 
could give different rights to different types of owners (e.g., for a takeover defense). 
Labor laws were also revised, in particular with the 2003 revision of the Labor Standards 
Law, to clarify the conditions under which dismissals are justified, thus affording 
companies more freedom in reorganization.9
 A final set of revisions concerned corporate governance. For corporate strategy, 
the shift towards ex-post dispute settlement means greatly increased managerial flexibility. 
The 2006 Corporation Law is explicit about this increased flexibility, but also introduces 
new means of oversight, by granting shareholders significant monitoring powers. 
Japanese annual shareholders’ meetings in the past were known for record-breaking 
brevity (lest any trouble occur). This has been replaced newly defined and much increased 
shareholder rights that facilitate, and structure the processes of, challenging management 
decisions (Schaede 2006). 
 
 
Market Change: The Unwinding of Cross-Shareholdings 
 These systemic changes occurred before the backdrop of a larger, underlying 
shift in corporate finance and corporate governance (Hoshi/Kashyap 2001). Beginning in 
the mid-1980s, financial deregulation allowed large firms to diversify their sources of 
funding, and many began to issue bonds and stocks more aggressively. By 2005, this had 
lowered the debt-equity ratio by more than half for all large firms, and even more 
dramatically in certain industries (cf. Figure 1). Figure 2 shows sources of financing 
outstanding for Japan’s largest firms for the period 1960-2005, both in terms of annual 
                                                 
9 The new labor law ended as a compromise between the political parties, employers and unions and still 
leaves ample ground for court interpretations in dismissal cases. However, in 2000 the courts had begun to 
water down the prohibitively stringent requirements for lawful dismissals, thus changing the legal 
interpretation to be more open towards corporate reorganization. See Schaede (forthcoming), Chapter 8. 
 12
flow (Figure 2a) as well as in stock of outstanding sources of finance (Figure 2b). Over 
time, bond and equity issues have risen such that, in 1998, for the first time since WWII 
Japanese large firms relied on more external financing in the form of stocks and bonds, 
than on bank loans. The banks’ role has further declined since, whereas market financing 
(through stock and bond issues) continues to rise. 
 Related to the decline in the role of the main bank was the loosening of business 
group (keiretsu) ties. Especially the horizontal groups have greatly reduced their cohesion, 
including in terms of preferential trade.10 One means of cohesion – both between banks 
and their clients, and among keiretsu members – had long been mutual shareholdings 
based on a tacit agreement that these would not be traded, in particular in times of crisis. 
These stable shareholdings had limited the number of shares actually traded, making the 
Japanese stock market very thin (i.e., illiquid). Thin markets constitute a problem for 
investors because positions cannot easily be altered in reaction to new information. Many 
Japanese stocks were easily subjected to price manipulations because so few shares could 
be bought or sold, leading to an amplified effect of any shifts in supply and demand.  
 This, too, began to change when cross-shareholdings unraveled throughout the 
1990s. Detailed data for the years 1987 through 2003 are available through two annual 
surveys that reveal a marked decline in cross-shareholdings, especially after 1998, from 
45% of all shares outstanding in the 1980s, to 38% in 1999 and 24% in 2003 (NLI 2004, 
DRI 2005). Moreover, a subgroup of stable shareholding, the strictly reciprocal “mutual 
shareholdings” (mochiai) have also greatly declined, from 17% of all shares outstanding, 
to 7% in 2003. The phenomenon had become so small that in April 2005 NLI announced 
                                                 
10 The Mitsubishi Group is a possible exception. See Schaede (2006) and Schaede (forthcoming, Chapter 
4) for a detailed analysis of  business groups. 
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the termination this portion of its survey (NLI web site, April 7, 2005; Suzuki 2005). 
 Companies were eager to reduce their stable shareholdings, because these had 
caused great losses in the 1990s, just when profitability was becoming a critical measure. 
The new accounting rules, effective 2001, of mark-to-market of cross-held shares added 
pressure to dissolve holdings that deteriorated performance data. The weakening of 
intra-group trade relations made “friendship shares” strategically less relevant. Adding to 
this were the bank mergers: companies that held stable shares in several banks to assure 
continued borrowing from these banks, could now reduce their holdings to just one 
(Kuroki 2003, Schaede 2006). 
 Yet, the largest contributors to the unraveling of cross-shareholdings were the 
large banks (city and long-term credit banks). Whereas in 1991, these 16 top banks held 
about 11% of total stock market capitalization, their holdings reduced to a mere 3.6% in 
2003 (DRI 2004: 6). If we include in the group of “large banks” the 47 regional banks, as 
of 2005 these banks owned a mere 4.5% of total shares at the Tokyo Stock Exchange (cf. 
Figure 3). The sell-off began with the bankruptcies of a few large and many smaller banks 
in the mid-1990s. An important trigger of the mass sell-off after 2001 was the new Law 
Limiting the Bank’s Stock Ownership (Ginkō-tō no kabushiki-tō no hoyū no seigen-tō ni 
kan suru hōritsu; hereafter “Ownership Limit Law”). Designed to limit the banks’ 
exposure to risky assets and thus improve the stability of the banking system, this law 
limits the total amount of corporate equity that one bank can own to its equity capital, 
narrowly defined as “Tier 1 capital”.11 In Fiscal Year 2001, the largest four banks alone 
                                                 
11 The Basel (or: BIS) Accord established two types (tiers) of  capital, of  which Tier 1 refers to the bank’s 
paid-in capital, shareholder’s equity, and retained earnings not yet appropriated at the end of  the fiscal year. 
Tier 2 capital, in contrast, consists of  the bank’s stock portfolio, plus loan loss reserves and subordinated 
debt issued by the bank.  
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were estimated to face a “shareholding overhang” of about ¥7 trillion, but remarkably, the 
banks did even more than was required. Between March 2001 and March 2003, 
commercial banks (excluding trust banks) reduced their shareholdings from ¥35.7 trillion 
to ¥18.2 trillion. The stock market moved sideways in this two-year period, so that banks 
halved their shareholdings, not due to stock price levels but to sell-offs (TSE 2004: 66, 
79).12
 The unraveling of cross-shareholdings introduced new liquidity into the market 
which made stock prices meaningful. In addition, Japan’s sudden attractiveness for 
foreign investors in the early 2000s was a confluence of several economic conditions that 
created investment opportunities. The write-off of non-performing loans and the 
aggressive “choose and focus” strategies made assets (firms, real estate, shares) available 
for purchase. The government’s zero-interest rate policy meant that financing these 
purchases was cheap. Moreover, in comparison to the US, Japanese assets were 
inexpensive (Diamond Weekly 2005, Ekonomisuto 2006). With legal processes clarified 
and the market offering a tremendous business opportunity, institutional investors and 
investment funds arrived in Japan. 
 
The Rise of New Shareholders: Institutional Investors 
 The changes in corporate finance and stable cross-shareholdings resulted in a 
                                                 
12 Reducing banks’ shareholdings lasted through April 2006. To facilitate this self-off, two “overflow 
repository” (“ukezara”) mechanisms were put into place. The first was the “Banks’ Shareholdings Purchase 
Corporation”, founded in 2002 by its member banks with a limited lifespan of  10 years. Equipped with 
funds of  ¥2 trillion, the corporation was tasked with buying shares from its members and selling these 
back to the market as appropriate. Between November 2002 and September 2004 the Bank of  Japan 
absorbed another ¥1.7 trillion worth of  banks’ shares (Nikkei May 11, 2006; Kuroki 2003: 6). By May 
2006, it was estimated that the “overflow repositories” had earned combined paper gains exceeding ¥2.8 
trillion on their holdings (Nikkei May 22, 2006). Note that the purchases by the Bank of  Japan and the 
Banks’ Shareholding Purchase Corporation both count as “corporate ownership” in Figure 3 below, so 
that the share of  corporate holdings would be even smaller without those “repository” holdings.  
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dramatic shift in Japan’s shareholder structure. At the height of the postwar system in the 
mid-1980s, corporations and banks together owned more than 70% of shares, while 
foreigners held less than 5%. The unraveling of cross-shareholdings has given rise, in 
their stead, to two new groups of owners: institutional investors and foreigners. Figure 3 
illustrates this shift: as of March 2006, foreigners represented the largest groups of 
investors at the TSE with 26.7% (in comparison, the share of foreign investors at the New 
York Stock Exchange was roughly 7% at the time). Industries in which foreign investors 
held more than 30% in 2005 included pharmaceuticals (37%), insurance (35%), precision 
machinery (34%), electronics (33%), non-bank financial services (32.5%), and 
automobiles and real estate (both at 31%) (TSE 2006: 8). Eleven of the largest listed 
companies had foreign ownership exceeding 50%, including Orix, Yamada Denki, Hoya, 
Rohm, Fuji Photo Film, Canon and Sony (Nikkei June 19, 2006). 
 It is important to note that not all “foreign” investment necessarily rooted in 
foreign money, as there was reason to believe that some foreign trust and hedge funds had 
attracted large amounts of Japanese money. Japanese banks in particular might have been 
interested in such indirect investment, because they were cash-rich during a period of zero 
interest loans in which they had curbed their lending due to capital adequacy constraints 
and the nonperforming loan crisis (Diamond Weekly 2005). Regardless of who was 
behind the money, however, foreign investors had arrived. In contrast to the previous 
“stable” shareholders, these aim to maximize return on investment and are unlikely to 
suffer quietly through long episodes of poor management. They have begun to challenge 
the processes of corporate governance and corporate control. 
 A second factor contributing to changes in corporate governance is the 
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emergence of Japanese institutional investors in the form of trust banks. As we can see 
from Figure 3, all financial institutions (large commercial banks, trust banks, insurance 
companies, and others) reduced their holdings from a total 41.5% in 1986, to 31.5% in 
2005. Within that group, the shrinkage in bank and insurance company holdings was 
counterbalanced by a substantial increase in the role of trust banks, from less than 10% in 
the 1980s, to 18.4% in 2005. Detailed data breaking on the trust category reveal that 
mutual funds (tōshi shintaku) account for 4.4% of total shareholdings, whereas pension 
funds make up 3.6% (TSE 2006). The remaining 10% of total shareholdings are so-called 
“investment trusts”, i.e. pooled investments by corporations, banks, and others that are 
administered by trust banks. 
 Trust banks have long enjoyed special status within Japan’s banking system, as 
they are commercial banks (collecting deposits) allowed to offer securities investments 
through funds. There were seven such banks in the postwar period, all of which suffered 
badly during the bubble period. Still, the trust bank as a category survived, and eventually 
these banks, through mergers into the newly established financial holdings, assumed 
increasing importance when fund investing became more popular in the 21st century.  
 Trust banks, therefore, are custodians for pooled investments. To streamline this 
administration, in the early 2000s the major bank groups consolidated securities 
processing by establishing three mega-trust banks. In 2000, the Japan Trustee Services 
Bank, Ltd. (Nihon turasuto saabisu shintaku ginkō) was founded by Sumitomo Trust & 
Banking, Resona Bank, and Mitsui Trust Holding. Referred to in Japanese as “trusts of 
trusts” (sai-shintaku), this bank specializes in securities processing and administering the 
trust businesses of two of the four main banking groups, as well as managing its own fund, 
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the “Japan Master Trust”. In 2006, 75% of revenues were fee income. Assets under 
management stood at ¥75 trillion in 2002, but doubled to ¥144 trillion (roughly $1.3 
trillion) as of March 2006.13 This tremendous growth makes Japan Trustee Services 
appear as a major shareholder for many major listed firms, often replacing the previous 
main banks as major shareholder. 
 Similarly, the Master Trust Bank of Japan (Nihon masutaa turasuto shintaku 
ginkō) was founded in 2002 as the specialized trust investor of the Mitsubishi UFJ group. 
In addition to Mitsubishi UFJ Trust&Banking, Nippon Life Insurance, and Meiji Yasuda 
Life Insurance, this bank also counted Nōchū Trust, the trust arm of the umbrella bank for 
all agricultural cooperatives, as a shareholder. With ¥106 trillion (almost $1 trillion) to 
invest, this bank became the second seemingly ubiquitous shareholder in the early 2000s, 
and 84% of revenues in 2006 were fee income.14 The Japanese trusts were joined by 
foreign trust administrators in the form of “street names”, which are investment vehicles 
for foreigners (these are included in the “foreigners” share in Figure 4.1). The two most 
prominent were State Street Bank & Trust Co. and Chase Manhattan Bank, London. 
These were mainly custodian holders for global institutional investors, and their rise is 
another contributing factor to the dominant role of foreign investors.    
 While these trusts are, at one level, simply custodians, they have begun to affect 
corporate management and the workings of the stock market. To be sure, custodians vote 
on proxy, i.e., as determined by the retail institution that offers the fund to investors, such 
                                                 
13 See the trust’s website, www.japantrustee.co.jp.  
14 Moreover, in January 2001 the Mizuho Financial Group established Trust&Custody Services Bank, Ltd. 
(Shisan kanri saabisu shintaku ginkō). Owned by Mizuho (54%) and four life insurance companies that 
became part of  that financial group after the merger of  the three original banks (Dai-Ichi, Asahi, Meiji 
Yasuda, and Fukuoka Mutual Life), as of  2006 this company was investing assets of  ¥94 trillion (roughly 
$900 billion). See www.mastertrust.co.jp, and www.tcsb.co.jp. 
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as an investment bank or a trust bank. Yet, it is usually not the original investors but the 
retail institutions that determine how to vote at the shareholders’ meeting (activist 
shareholders tend to invest on their own accounts rather than through trusts). Fund 
managers are competing against each other for returns on their various funds, and 
therefore value returns on equity higher than long-term stability. The difference to Japan’s 
previous main banks and business group members as major shareholders could not be 
more pronounced, because institutional investors have the opposite interest in corporate 
performance. Recall that banks pushed their clients towards diversification to increase 
loan volume while reducing risk as companies were hedged against failure through their 
diversified business portfolio. Trusts, in contrast, diversify their portfolio through their 
own investments. They demand transparency and simplicity: ideally, they want a 
company to be in only one business, easily comparable to its competitors. Trusts pick the 
most profitable firms, and invest across a large number of industries. This shift in interest 
of dominant providers of finance has further reinforced the strategic shift away from high 
diversification to “choose and focus” strategies. 
 
3. Mergers and Acquisitions: The Buyout Wave 
 
 These developments have invited unprecedented activity in the market for 
mergers and acquisitions. Figures 4 through 7 highlight the recent quantitative explosion 
and qualitative change of M&A in Japan. Figure 4 shows the steep increase in the overall 
number of deals, in particular after 1998 (the onset of strategic reversal). The chart 
displays three types of deals, “out-in” (foreign money purchasing Japanese assets), 
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“out-out” (foreign money purchasing foreign assets in Japan), and “in-in” (domestic 
deals). Although we see an expansion of “out-in” M&A beginning in 2000, the main 
reason for the increase in activity is clearly the upsurge in domestic deals from a level of 
roughly 600 per year in the mid-1990s, to 1,800 in 2005. In terms of value of these 
transactions, data are available only for public deals, which amount to 20-40% of total 
transactions. These data exhibit a similarly dramatic rise: the annual value of domestic 
M&A rose from less than ¥2 trillion in 1997 to over ¥10 trillion level in 1999, and ¥15 
trillion (roughly $13 billion) in 2005 (Nomura 2006). The upward trend continued in the 
first half of 2006, when both the number of deals (1,409 in six months) and their value 
(¥7.3 trillion) hit record highs (Nikkei, July 1, 2006). 
 Figures 5 and 6 speak to the type of M&A as well as the objective underlying 
these acquisitions. The lowest bar in Figure 5 shows that mergers (a marriage between 
equals) account for only a small portion of all deals and have not increased over time. The 
growth in activity is attributable to takeovers (checkered bar), the purchase of assets from 
another company, and the purchase of minority stakes in other companies. Figure 6 
identifies the reasons why companies would make these purchases: almost two thirds of 
deals in the early 21st century were made with an eye towards “choose and focus” (the 
striped bar), that is, to strengthen existing businesses by purchasing either assets or entire 
organizations of competitors in order to assume a more dominant market position. 
“Intra-group restructuring” refers to the reorganization of business units, including 
spin-offs or mergers among subsidiaries; these increased in the “saisei” (revitalization) 
years of 2002 and 2003, but have petered out, perhaps because this type of reorganization 
has been accomplished in many companies. In other words, Figure 6 tells a story of 
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increased M&A activity, initially to reorganize existing business, then to acquire 
competitors in the same business. In contrast, entering a new business, which accounted 
for a quarter of all domestic deals as recently as the early 1990s, has become negligible. 
 Critics submit that recent growth notwithstanding, the Japanese market for M&A 
remains deplorably small. In 2004, total global mergers topped $2 trillion, but Japan 
accounted for only 4.3% of that total. And even though overseas buyers have spent plenty 
on Japanese companies, that investment is tiny compared to the $1.2 trillion of U.S. 
buyouts between 1999 and 2004 (Dhaliwall 2005, Rowley 2005). A 2004 government 
report identified five main infrastructure problems obstructing an even faster growth of 
M&A in Japan (ESRI 2004): (1) human capital (building of expertise in analysis and 
information brokerage); (2) knowledge of M&A strategies (to alleviate “vulture” fears 
and allow firms to adopt appropriate defensive measures against hostile takeover bids); 
(3) infrastructure that supports new business creation (ranging from ease of starting a new 
firm to societal judgment against failure); (4) legal infrastructure; and (5) related services 
(including law firms specializing in M&A). It is important to note, however, that since 
2004 great strides have been made in all of these areas. Therefore, even though Japan’s 
M&A market may still be comparatively small, it is growing rapidly, and the 
infrastructure – supporting industries such as litigation and financial lawyers, securities 
analysts, and the legal environment – is likewise growing towards accommodating a more 
active market.  
 
Hostile Takeovers 
 Figure 4 revealed that one third of all M&A (or 690 deals) in 2005 were 
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takeovers. These come in two flavors: friendly and hostile. In a friendly majority 
acquisition, the target agrees with the deal, a fair price is established, and executive 
management of the target may remain involved in running the business. In contrast, 
hostile takeovers often involve fierce battles which typically end in shareholder discontent, 
price run-ups, and even lawsuits. Traditionally, Japan has recorded very few hostile 
takeovers. One reason may be an element of “saving face”, by no means singular to Japan 
but possibly more pronounced there, which entices parties to label an acquisition 
“friendly” even when it is not. More importantly, the extensive amount of 
cross-shareholdings in Japan until the 1990s thwarted the purchase of a company against 
its wishes. Adding to this, until 1999 Japan did not have a rule of compulsory acquisition 
of minor stakes once a raider had managed to buy up the majority of shares, which made 
it difficult to acquire 100% of stock. And finally, capital gain taxes applied to the sale of 
shares even in a hostile takeover bid, making many minority owners even less willing to 
surrender their shares to a hostile raider (Higashino 2004).15  
 Takeover data show that the 1999 revision of these bottlenecks have opened the 
door for hostile takeovers in Japan. The increase in highly touted successful and failed 
bids suggests that “saving face” is no longer as important as corporate reorganization. 
Figure 7 shows the increase in uninvited yet successful takeover bids. While the absolute 
number is still small, the steep slope of the trend line is surprising, and by 2005, there was 
on average one successful bid per week. The majority of these hostile takeovers is not 
                                                 
15 Antitrust rules on mergers are also being revised. The traditional rule-of-thumb had been to permit 
mergers that resulted in a market share of  the new entity of  no more than 35%. In the early 2000s, to 
support the government program of  “reorganization” Japan’s Fair Trade Commission had allowed 
mergers even where they resulted in market share exceeding 50%. In 2006, the JFTC suggested to replace 
the maximum market share rule with a case-by-case evaluation, similar to that in the U.S. and Europe, 
based on more sophisticated market share calculation and the particular situation of  the industry 
concerned. See Nikkei Weekly June 16, 2006, Nikkei June 16, 2006, Nikkei January 10, 2006. 
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launched by funds, but rather due to corporations acquiring other corporations. This trend 
continued into 2006, which recorded the first intra-industry hostile takeovers. The August 
2006 bid by Oji Paper to acquire Hokuetsu Paper for its advanced production facility was 
Japan’s first true “choose and focus” bid, in that Oji attempted to acquire a direct 
competitor to establish dominance of the domestic paper market. In the same month, 
menswear retailer Aoki launched a hostile bid for Futata, a competitor with a presence in 
Kyushu that Aoki lacked. Both battles occupied headlines for a while, though neither bid 
was eventually successful. However, both resulted in a reshuffling of their industries, as 
the targets then tied up with another competitor to strengthen their market positions. The 
high profile of the two concurrent intra-industry battles caught the public’s attention. The 
fact that both battles plaid out in mature industries, with very traditional companies 
involved, characterized that hostile takeovers had reached “old” Japan, and that slimming 
margins and a fierce fight for competitive positioning were likely to trigger a bigger 
hostile takeover wave yet to come (Sankei Shinbun, August 9, 2006). 
 In light of the rapid increase in takeovers in the early 2000s, the Ministries of 
Justice and that of Economy, Trade and Industry in 2004 convened a study group to 
prepare the release of a new Takeover Guideline. The study group was tasked with 
addressing the political reality of fast-spreading fear of aggressive foreign investment and 
the economic necessity of companies to develop legal and market strategies for corporate 
renewal. The resulting 2005 Takeover Guideline was based on four principal objectives: 
to ensure the increase in corporate value, to adopt global standards in Japan, to ensure 
equal treatment of all bidders (domestic or foreign), and to expand the choice for 
managers in defending hostile bids. From these principles, it was only a brief jump to 
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allow “reasonable defense measures”, and the Guideline effectively validated a “poison 
pill” (a mechanism that makes a hostile bid prohibitively expensive) in the form of new 
warrant issues that dilute the raider’s stake.16
 The 2006 Corporation Law made the 2005 Takeover Guideline binding and 
clarified the role of shareholders in the structuring of defense mechanisms against 
takeover attempts, by giving shareholders a choice to issue a carte blanche for such 
mechanisms, or to insist on ratification each time new defense schemes are introduced. 
However, based on the opinion that Japan remained comparatively week in takeover 
defense (in particular in comparison with U.S. mechanisms such as poison pills and 
golden parachutes or golden shares as known in Europe), the Corporation Law’s final 
market-opening clause was delayed until May 2007, until when foreigners could acquire 
Japanese firms only with cash but not through stock swaps. This one-year delay looked 
more like a political compromise within Japan than a market-closing measure, because 
share-for-share deals are hardly ever hostile, so that the delay obstructed friendly 
acquisitions while leaving the door wide open for hostile bids by foreign entities. 
Moreover, all hostile takeovers in 2005 were domestic. In any event, many expected a 
further increase in hostile takeovers for 2007.  
 Some observers predicted Japanese firms to use the new Takeover Guideline to 
introduce a plethora of defense mechanisms. However, according to a poll of June 2006, 
only 27% of listed Japanese companies were considering the introduction of such 
measures (Nikkei June 19, 2006). Nishiyama (2006) found that between May 2005 and 
                                                 
16 Milhaupt (2005) offers a detailed analysis how the Guideline represents an adaptation of  Delaware 
takeover rules to the Japanese setting. See METI/MOJ (2005) for the “Guidelines for Corporate Value 
Protection” (Takeover Guidelines), and CVSG (Corporate Value Study Group, 2006) for the 2006 report 
on takeover activities and policies.  
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May 2006, only 91 very large Japanese companies (all with below average 
return-on-equity and capital market evaluation) had introduced defense mechanisms. 
Similar to the recent experience in Europe, the main concern expressed by shareholders 
on these various tools to thwart attempted takeovers was a lack of transparency and a 
potential override of shareholders’ rights and interests by self-serving incumbent 
management. While, as of October 2006, it was too early to discuss the actual processes 
and defense mechanisms Japan will establish, it was noteworthy that these mechanisms 
were discussed within Japan with uncommon and unprecedented interest by shareholders 
themselves. The fact that shareholders now vote on takeover defenses means that 
Japanese companies will differ over time in the extent to which shareholders can affect 
takeover battle (Miyazaki 2006, Nikkei June 27, 2006). 
 Also as of 2006, critics complained that the Takeover Guidelines and the delay of 
share-for-share deals by foreigners were all signs of “old Japan’s” restrictive practices 
prevailing. However, it should be noted that the United States, with the most active 
market for hostile takeovers, takes credit for inventing some of the most powerful defense 
mechanisms, so that the argument that Japanese companies ought to be allowed to 
structure their own defenses in an effort to create a level global playing field is not 
unreasonable. But perhaps more importantly, the objective with a hostile takeover is 
typically to purchase an underperforming company, replace its management and business 
model, and improve performance of the company. The best defense against such a 
takeover is for management to undertake these reforms by itself, to ensure that its stock 
price is not underperforming. Therefore, whether or not a hostile bid is launched or 
eventually successful is not as relevant as the potential threat of a hostile takeover in 
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introducing managerial discipline. The one-year delay in allowing all types of foreign 
purchases of Japanese companies does not negate this positive overall effect on corporate 
governance and economic performance.17
 
4. Investment Funds 
 
 As institutional investors began to affect the dominant mode of stock investments 
in Japan, the market became ever more attractive to one type of institutional investor, the 
investment funds. Perhaps the first contemporary buyout fund that attracted general 
interest to this industry in the United States was Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. with its 
takeover of RJR Nabisco in the 1980s (KKR contributed to the image of “vultures” for 
realizing that RJR Nabisco’s parts were temporarily worth more than the total and 
breaking the company into pieces for immediate financial gain rather than longer-term 
value creation). The late 1990s saw the resurgence of private funds that pool investments 
by a large number of investors (e.g., wealthy individuals, pension funds, and corporations) 
into targeted, aggressive investments. Their area of specialization differs, as some invest 
generically in underpriced assets and arbitrage opportunities, while others focus on a 
particular type of investment, such as real estate. The most dominant type in Japan in the 
early 2000s were private equity funds that identified underperforming corporations and 
brought in their own management team for a turnaround. Ripplewood’s 1999 purchase of 
the Long-Term Credit Bank and transformation into and partial sale of the highly 
                                                 
17 The threat of  a potential takeover is fundamentally different in terms of  corporate governance from the 
previous system of  bank monitoring. See Schaede (2006) and Schaede (forthcoming) for the differences 
between the banks’ “contingent monitoring” (activated only when a company fell into negative net worth, 
but not when it was underperforming for years on end) and “continuous” governance by institutional 
investors and others constantly monitoring management performance. 
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successful Shinsei Bank in 2004 is a prime example for this type of activity. In April 2006, 
KKR launched a new fund of an estimated $12 billion, and in June 2006 Bain Capital, one 
of the world’s largest buyout funds, also opened offices in Tokyo (Nikkei, May 16 and 
June 30, 2006). 
Figure 8 sheds light on acquisitions by investment funds in Japan between 1998 
and 2005. Whereas in 1998, investment funds accounted for only 2% of all M&A in Japan, 
by 2005 their share had increased to over 13%. Initially foreign investors (striped bars) 
were prominent, but in the early 2000s, the domestic investment funds joined the fray and 
overtook deals by foreign funds in 2005. 
 
Foreign Funds 
 The first foreign investors with a keen interest in Japan’s 1990s recession were 
financial firms (such as GE Capital), insurance companies (after deregulation of that 
industry in 1995) and investment banks. Realizing that Japanese assets were offered in 
fire-sales, often as low as for 10 cents to the dollar, the early investors made bets on 
long-term recovery. Ripplewood’s takeover of Long-Term Credit Bank, Lone Star’s 
acquisition of Tokyo Sowa Bank, and Cerberus purchase (from Softbank) of Aozora Bank 
are all examples of their activities around the turn of the century. A bit more quietly, 
Goldman Sachs began to purchase hotel resorts and golf courses. When the real estate 
market began to thin out at around 2000, the foreign investment funds started 
“turnaround” (or “distressed”) funds aiming at companies hit by the extended recession, 
which earned them the nickname “vulture funds”. According to one estimate, between 
1997 and 2002, the “vultures” bought more than ¥30 trillion ($300 billion) of distressed 
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assets (Kawakami 2002). 
 The foreign interest in Japan was sustained in the early 2000s when U.S. assets 
(in particular real estate) began to look overvalued compared to Japan. Positive economic 
forecasts for Japan promised quick returns on investment. But perhaps most importantly, 
it was easy to launch new funds in Japan, as Japanese institutional investors such as 
pension funds, life insurance companies, and banks were flush with money but badly 
lacking investment opportunities. Japanese banks, in particular, were often interested in 
quietly investing in foreign buyout funds, to avoid to appear unpatriotic “vultures” when 
buying up assets underlying their own, or their competitors’, bad loans. According to one 
estimate, foreigners provided hardly more than 10% of total buyout fund capitalization in 
Japan in 2004 (Diamond Weekly 2005).  
 
Japanese Funds 
 The success of U.S.-managed funds in Japan naturally also attracted Japanese 
players. The first independent Japanese buyout fund was Advantage Partners in 1997, 
which continues to be one of the industry leaders (CJEB 2005). At the turn of the century, 
it was joined by some of Japan’s more aggressive and established venture capital funds, 
who with the burst of the IT bubble identified better opportunities in management buyouts. 
Led by JAFCO and Tokio Marine Capital (TMC), many Japanese VC began to launch 
new MBO funds, beginning in 2002, to shift business away from the sluggish domestic 
startup market and into the hot “reorganization and revitalization” segment of the 
economy.18  
                                                 
18 Interview, Tokio Marine Capital, January 2005, Tokyo. See Schaede (2005) on Japanese venture 
capital firms, and their activities in management buyouts in the early 2000s. 
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 Figure 9 highlights the development of the Japanese investment fund industry. 
From the humble beginnings of Advantage Partners in 1997, the total number of funds 
had risen to 108 in 2005, with a total of ¥1.8 trillion (roughly $ 15 billion) in assets raised 
during this period. Many of these funds are subsidiaries of banks, insurance companies, 
and corporations, such as Aozora Investment Co., Millennia Venture Partners, Nikko 
Antfactory, ORIX Capital, or Mitsui Ventures. While they attract a variety of investors, 
such as pension funds or other companies, their objectives may be guided by the parent’s 
interest. Beginning in the late 1990s independent investment funds also became 
prominent, such as MKS Partners and Unison Capital. The introduction of the limited 
liability partnership as a legal organization in 2006 allowed these funds to reward partners 
according to their own track record, which has attracted new funds as well as new talent 
to work at these funds. 
 The industry received a further push by the government, when in 2001 the 
Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) received a special budget of $900 million to invest in 
“corporate revival funds”, which were buyout funds geared toward supporting corporate 
reorganization of smaller firms in rural Japan. This triggered the formation, in 2002, of 
Phoenix Capital, a joint venture between Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank and DBJ. Other banks 
soon followed suit, leading to large banks establishing buyout funds to accelerate 
reorganization of their business groups (Kawakami 2003). In other words, banks began to 
buy out the assets underlying their own non-performing loan portfolios, to create an 
upside potential for the restructuring of these companies through debt-equity swaps 
(MRI/Chikusei 2004). 
 The combination of the active launching of private equity funds and bank-led 
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funds to purchase assets in corporate reorganization schemes have contributed greatly to 
the restructuring of Japanese industry. One industry where “choose and focus” is 
particularly visible is electronics, where the ten “general electronics firms” have all spun 
off large chunks of peripheral business to zoom in on core businesses in which to compete 
more powerfully. In some cases, the spun-off entities remain exclusive suppliers; in others, 
they are shaped by their new owners into independent companies that supply multiple 
buyers in an increasingly global marketplace. These developments have begun to affect 
industrial organization in Japan, as market shares have become much less stable and 
industry leaders are more frequently replaced by newly strengthened old competitors or 
new entries to the industry.  
 
5. Conclusions: The New Competition for Investors 
 
 The composition of shareholders in Japan has greatly changed over the last 
decade. For companies, this shift has enormous implications for business strategies and 
corporate management. During the postwar period, management of large firms aimed to 
increase sales, almost at any cost, to please the main lenders as well as, to a lesser degree, 
other members of their business groups and stable shareholders. The typical process for 
rectifying mismanagement was for the business group to consult quietly, but only when 
the company faced bankruptcy did the main bank step in to replace management with 
bankers who organized an informal debt restructuring. The main banks had a stronghold 
over corporate information, and details of the restructuring were rarely made public. In 
this setting, the president of a large firm was mostly interested in stability and certainty: if 
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there were no large swings in corporate performance, there would be no outside 
interference. Risk-taking was rarely rewarded. Shareholders other than banks and 
corporations were typically too small or too diversified to intervene. Shareholder rights 
were limited, and shareholder meetings were typically short and provided limited 
opportunity for activists to speak out.  
 All of this has become a thing of the past. Companies are now concerned with 
the cost of financing: unlike the postwar period, when interest rates on bank loans were 
regulated at a low level and were the same for companies of similar size, capital market 
financing is based on the price mechanism. The better the corporate performance, the 
cheaper it is to raise money from the markets. The new dominant shareholders, 
institutional investors, are driven by a profitability goal in competition with each other for 
investors. Low performing companies will either face intervention (voice) or be dumped 
from the portfolio (exit). Loyalty, as exhibited by the previous stable cross-shareholders, 
cannot be expected from these investors. Therefore, underperforming companies will see 
a drop in stock price, which in turn might invite hostile takeover bids. The new owners 
have also reinforced pressure on Japanese firms to reorient their corporate strategies, as 
their interests – transparent business models with clear-cut performance data, ideally in a 
limited set of businesses so as to allow direct comparison with competitors – differ 
fundamentally from those of Japanese banks in the postwar period. 
 Where institutional investors fail to monitor, two new potential threats to 
management have appeared: buyout funds and hostile bidders. Considered by some for 
their potential negative effects as either “vulture funds” or “corporate raiders”, these 
nonetheless work to keep management on its toes. Because this is a recent development, 
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data are still too limited to analyze whether mergers and acquisitions in Japan have served 
to increase performance of the buyout targets. However, the effect for the overall 
economy is to increase large firms’ sensitivity to profit measures, efficiency, and 
competitiveness.  
 The legal reforms between 1997 and 2006 enabled the M&A market in Japan, 
and they also reflect a shift in corporate strategic thinking, as many firms were highly 
supportive of these reforms. Japanese firms now pay close attention to measures such as 
return on equity, return on investment, and profit margins. Revisions of accounting rules 
towards consolidated statements and mark-to-market of assets make it impossible to hide 
loss-leaders in subsidiaries. Increased disclosure requirements give all investors easy 
access to the same information. The introduction of quarterly earnings reports for listed 
companies has further increased the timeliness of this information. Overall, Japanese 
management practices have been oriented towards the market. 
 This change towards the markets is anchored in a large number of separate laws, 
supported by complementary legal revisions in employment, and the rapid emergence of 
supporting industries, such as financial lawyers, litigation lawyers, securities analysts and 
other information providers, and the courts. Underperforming management now can, and 
is, being sued by shareholders. Violations of rules are prosecuted strictly, as the Livedoor 
accounting scandal and the Murakami insider trading violation have made clear. Gone are 
the days when corporate executives caught at wrongdoing were simply promoted to 
chairman; in the 21st century, they might be serving a prison term. While recent 
accounting and other scandals suggest that there is still room for regulatory improvement, 
the direction of change is clearly towards the market. It is inconceivable that all of these 
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reforms can be unraveled; the new market orientation of Japanese firms as they compete 
for investors is here to stay. 
 From a normative perspective, it is difficult to say whether the shift towards 
“choose and focus”, the increased attention to institutional investors and investment funds, 
and the emergence of hostile takeovers are necessary all positive. Research for the United 
States has provided mixed evaluations of the benefits of mergers and acquisitions. As we 
learned from the memorable Gordon Gekko in the 1987 Hollywood movie “Wall Street”, 
buyout funds are not primarily interested in economic value creation. Moreover, after a 
decade of aggressive unbundling in the 1990s, US firms are moving back towards 
strategic diversification around well-defined core businesses. It is clear, however, that the 
“choose and focus”-type reorganization of Japan in the early 21st century has greatly 
contributed to cleaning up the aftermath of exuberant diversification of the bubble period 
years. Moreover, for better or for worse, after a decade-long hiatus Japanese companies 
are now reentering global markets in full competitive strengths with corporate profiles 
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Figure 1:  The Debt-Equity Ratio of Japanese Firms, 1960-2004 
Source: Calculated from Hōjin kigyō tōkei; “large companies” refer to firms      
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Figure 2a:  Flow Data for Corporate Financing, 1960-2004: Retained Earnings,  
  Bank Loans and External Financing 
  Source: calculated from Hōjin kigyō tōkei; for all “large firms” with  






















Figure 2b:  Stock Data for Corporate Financing, 1960-2004: Retained Earnings,  
  Bank Loans and External Financing 































Figure 3:  Ownership Percentages, by Type of Investor 
    Source: TSE (2006), in % of total market capitalization, as of March of each  
   year. 
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Figure 4:  Mergers and Acquisitions, by Number of Deals, 1986-2005 































Figure 5:  Domestic M&A Deals, in Number, by Deal Scheme 









'93 '94 '95 '96 '97 '98 '99 '00 '01 '02 '03 '04 '05

















Figure 6:  Domestic M&A Deals, in Number, by Objective 
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Figure 7:  Hostile Takeover Bids, in Number of Successful Deals, 1995-2005 







































Figure 8:  Acquisitions by Investment Funds, 1998-2005 















































Figure 9:  Japanese Investment Funds: New Fund Creations and Assets under  
  Management 






























































Table 1:  The Most Important Legal Changes of the early 21st Century  
  (Note: Unless otherwise noted, the date refer to the time that the 
        revision passed the Diet; implementation usually occurs the following year) 
  Source: Schaede (forthcoming), Chapter 1 
 
Year Commercial Law Other Laws Accounting/Tax Labor 
1997 Simplification of 
merger processes 
Lifting ban on holding 
companies (AML revision) 
  
1998 Stock repurchases 
allowed 
Foreign Exchange Law;  
Financial System Reform 
Law (“Big Bang”); Two 




1999 Equity-swap system; 
Equity transfer 
system 
Special Measures Law on 
Industrial Revitalization 
Adoption of tax effect 
accounting; 





2000 New spin-off 
(divestiture) system;  
Simplification of 
transfer of business, 
M&As 
Civil Revitalization Law, to 
streamline bankruptcy 
procedures 
Full-scale shift to 
consolidated accounting;   
Mark-to-market valuation 
of financial assets (except 
cross-shareholdings) 
Employees 
stripped of  
veto right in 
business 
spin-offs 
2001 Abolition of par 








“Guideline for Multi-Party 
Workouts” for bankruptcy 
cases; Law Limiting Banks’ 
Shareholdings 




Statutory auditor system 
expanded; Corporate 






2002 Various types of 
stocks allowed; New 
stock option system; 
New corporate 
governance rules 
Program for Financial 
Revival; Banks’ 
Shareholdings Purchase 
Corp. begins holdings of 
corporate equity  
Consolidated tax return 
system 
 
2003 Treasury stock 
purchase system (for 
use in M&A) 
Revision of Corporate 
Reorganization Law and 
Liquidation Law;  
Revision of Industrial 
Revitalization Law; New 
Business Development 
Promotion Law (¥1 firms) 
New standards for 
accounting of impaired 
assets; 
Listed companies must file 









2005  Takeover Guideline   
     
2006 Corporation Law enacted: 
abolition of YK; introduction of LLC; M&A rules 
streamlined; variety of stock types that limit certain 
privileges allowed; officer/auditor rules reduced for 
closed-held KK; managerial flexibility and liabilities 
increased for large KK (shareholder litigation; 




Impairment accounting to 
be fully applied for fixed 





of Older Persons 
revised 
(retirement age 
raised to 65) 
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